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WHEN IS A CONFLICT REALLY A
CONFLICT? OUTING AND THE LAW
In 1990, OutWeek—a relatively unknown gay magazine—printed a
cover story which "outed" Malcolm Forbes.' That is, the magazine
printed details of the publishing tycoon's gay life.' Forbes was a well-
known figure, so the mainstream national media noticed the story, and
began a debate over the ethics of outing. 3 Since then, other prominent
people have been outed, including entertainment figures such as David
Geffen and Jodie Foster, and political figures such as Pete Williams. 4
With the advent of outing, the specter arose that an outed person
might lose a job, friends, reputation, or face a number of other risks
posed by being a known homosexual in an intolerant and prejudiced
society.' Proponents of outing, in response to this scenario, argued that
by remaining "in the closet" and invisible, gay people perpetuate their
own oppression.6
 Outing famous and powerful gay people, the propo-
I LARRY GROSS, CONTESTED CLOSETS: THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF OUTING 1 (1993); see
MICHELANGELO SIGNORILE, QUEER IN AMERICA 70-77 (1993).
2 Michelangelo Signorile, The Other Side of Malcolm, OUTWEEK, Mar. 18, 1990, reprinted in
GRoss, supra note 1, at 207, 207-16.
3 GROSS, supra note 1, at 60-64; Jon E. Grant, Note, "Outing" and Freedom of the Press: Sexual
Orientation's Challenge to the Supreme Court's Categorical Jurisprudence, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 103,
105 n.13 (1991). For examples of the media debate, see the articles reprinted in GRoss, supra
note 1, at 217.
4
 See infra notes 202-09 and accompanying text; see generally GROSS, supra note I; SIGNORI LE,
supra note 1. The most recent outing involves publisher Jann Wenner. See Richard Goldstein,
"Wink Wink, Nudge Nudge," VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 14, 1995, at S.
Arguably, this Note engages in outing. The names appealing in the text are limited to a few
representative examples, all of which were widely publicized. Sonic direct quotes within the
footnotes include less-publicized names. 1n all cases, however, the names contained in this Note
have appeared in a number of sources. Accordingly, the use of these names represents only a
limited further invasion of privacy.
5 See GROSS, supra note 1, at 2. Some commentators argue that, if nothing is wrong with
being gay, then nothing should be wrong with the world knowing it. See infra notes 175-76 and
accompanying text. Civil rights attorney and Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz has an-
swered this by saying, in regard to bringing a defamation claim for outing, "No court is going to
say that calling someone gay is legally defamatory, because to say that is to buy into the notion
that being gay is somehow bad. On the other band, you and I know that being exposed as gay
can be harmful to a person." Pat H. Broeske & John M. Wilson, Outing Targets Hollywood, L.A.
TIMES, July 22, 1990, at 0.
6 See GRoss, supra note 1, at 20. The issues within this Note apply equally to gays, lesbians
and bisexuals. For simplicity, the Note will use the term "gay." Many academics and activists have
started to use the term "queer," which distinguishes itself from the normal, as opposed to the
heterosexual. Michael Warner, introduction to FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND
SociAl, THEORY, vii, xxvi (Michael Warner ed., 1993). "Queer" points to normalization, rather
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nents reason, will make homosexuality visible.' Visibility, they contend,
represents an important and necessary step on the path toward equal-
ity.' Opponents of outing claim that the practice invades the outed
person's individual freedom.9
Legal commentators who have considered the possibility of a legal
remedy for an outed person have focused on the longstanding conflict
between privacy and the First Amendment." Although a tort for the
invasion of privacy exists, plaintiffs are often precluded from prevailing
in civil suits against the mass media." When privacy rights and the First
Amendment conflict, the First Amendment usually wins. 12 First Amend-
ment jurisprudence would demand that outing be tolerated—perhaps
even celebrated—as part of the robust, open debate upon which the
Supreme Court believes our democracy depends.' 5
This Note argues that the justifications behind the First Amend-
ment and the right to privacy are actually very similar: both seek to
protect an individual's right to participate in government and to achieve
self-fulfillment." Gay people who are outed are hindered in their
ability to speak, their ability to participate in government and their
ability to achieve self-fulfillment." Outing, because the justifications for
privacy and the freedom of speech converge, rather than conflict,
presents a good vehicle for reexamining the purposes and the bounds
of the invasion of privacy tort in relation to the First Amendment."
than intolerance, as the site of violence. Id. "Queer" also works against "mandatory gender
divisions." Id.
7 Douglas Crimp, Right On Girlfriend!, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER PoLurics AND
SociAt. THEORY 300, 311 (Michael Warner ed., 1993); see Larry Bush, Naming Gay Names,
VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 27, 1982, reprinted in CROSS, supra note I, at 177, 181.
8 See Steve Warren, "'Idling 'Tales' about Celebrity Closets," an Interview with Armistead Maupin,
Au COURANT, Oct, 23, 1989, reprinted in GROSS, supra note 1, at 200, 201-02.
9 See, e.g., C. Carr, Why Outing Must Stop, VILIACE VOICE, Mar. 19, 1991, reprinted in Gauss,
supra note 1, at 274, 279.
Ill See John P. Elwood, Note, Outing, Privacy, and the First Amendment, 102 YALE L.J. 747,
749-50 (1991); Grant, supra note 3, at 103; David H. Pollack, Comment, Forced Out of the Closet:
Sexual Orientation and the Legal Dilemma of "Outing," 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 711, 711 (1992);
Ronald E Wick, Note, Out of the Closet and Into the Headlines: "Outing" and the Private Facts Tort,
80 GEO. 14 413, 415-16 (1991).
II Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black, 68 TEx. L.
REv. 1195, 1198 (1990).
12 Id.
13 See Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People
by the Media, 88 YALE LJ, 1577, 1597, 1622 (1979); see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
14 See infra notes 127-31, 265-67 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 254-64 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
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Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of First Amendment
theory, and then traces the relevant United States Supreme Court First
Amendment cases." Part II provides an overview of the right to privacy,
and then examines two representative privacy cases.'s Part III tells the
story of outing, explains the political importance of coming out, ex-
plores arguments for and against the practice, and examines a case
that approximates an outing.'`' Finally, this Note concludes that outing,
because it illustrates the convergence of privacy and political speech,
shows the need to reexamine the invasion of privacy tort in relation to
the First Amendment."
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
This section will begin with an examination of the First Amend-
ment, because the First Amendment fundamentally affects liability for
printed information. 2 ' Part A briefly explores the most common theo-
retical justifications asserted for First Amendment protection. 22 Part B
examines use of these justifications in Supreme Court cases when
privacy and the First Amendment conflict."
A. The Theory
Current First Amendment jurisprudence is a relatively new phe-
nomenon." Modern First Amendment theory in the United States
Supreme Court began in 1919 with a series of well-known opinions by
two notable Justices of that Court: Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis
D. Brandeis. 25 From these opinions, as well as from subsequent com-
mentators, three general justifications for First Amendment protec-
tions have evolved: the marketplace of ideas, self-fulfillment and self-
govern men t."
17 See infra notes 21-118 and accompanying text.
1"See infra notes 119-78 and accompanying text..
19 See infra notes 179-240 and accompanying text.
2"See infra notes 241 -75 and accompanying text.
21 The First Amendment to the Constitution states, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make
no law , .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CoNs -r. amend. 1.
22 See infra notes 24-52 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 53-113 and accompanying text.
21 See David Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE, Pourics to Law 237, 237 (David Kairys ed.,
rev. ed. 1990).
25 IE,g„ Nina Lahav, Holmes and Brandeis: Libertarian and Republican fusiificatimis for Free
Speech, 411, & Pot.. 451, 452 (1988). The first three cases in the series, decided in 1919, were
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), and
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
26 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN Socre'ry 6-17 (1992).
590	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 36:587
Justice Holmes explained the marketplace of ideas in his dissent
in Abrams v. United States. 27
 According to this justification, the best way
to find and test ideas is through "the competition of the market." 28
Truth is most likely to be found when all opinions are expressed openly
and the public may compare and contrast opposing opinions. 29
 Free-
dom of expression, therefore, derives value from its role in discovering
truth." Since Abrams, the marketplace of ideas paradigm has had a
continuous influence on First Amendment jurisprudence. 81
Modern criticisms of the marketplace theory focus on an assump-
tion contained within the theory: that everyone has meaningful speech
that benefits from the protections offered by the First Amendment. 82
Critics argue that the marketplace of ideas, which might work in theory,
is in practice subject to distortion based on disparities in power." The
marketplace theory assumes that everyone already possesses an equal
ability to speak."
Where a minority group or a group with fewer resources has
limited access to speech to begin with, then the protection offered by
27
 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes' dissent marked the first time
that a Supreme Court Justice attached a theory of freedom of expression to the First Amendment.
Lahav, supra note 25, at 454. Holmes wrote:
[W] hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can
be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Commentators have observed that Holmes' theory derives from the liberal views of John
Stuart Mill. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, 15-52 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859);
Lahav, supra note 25, at 455; Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory
of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U. L REV. 54, 68-69 (1989).
28
 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Solum, supra note 27, at 69.
3° Lahav, supra note 25, at 455; Solurn, Supra note 27, at 69.
31
 Lahav, supra note 25, at 471-81; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
Justice Brennan's opinion in Sullivan invoked the need for "robust, and wide-open" debate and
quoted Judge Learned Hand's opinion that "right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out
of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection." Id. (citing United
States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
32
 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHNI, Free Speech and its Relations to Self
-Government, in POLITICAL
FREP:Dora 86 (1948). Meiklejohn wrote, "the stark fact remains that the First Amendment is a
negation. it protects. It forbids interference with something. And that protection can have value
only as the 'something' which is protected has value." Id.
"DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 272 (1989). In the context of pornography,
Rhode wrote, "While in theory, the best response to false and degrading speech may be more
speech, in practice such an approach is limited by disparities in power, status, and money among
the potential speakers. By definition, the First Amendment protects only those able to exercise
the rights it secures." Id.
34 CATHARINE A. MacKiNNoN, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 140, 157-58 (1987).
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the First Amendment might be not only of minimal value, but also, in
some cases, detrimental." In the context of pornography, Professor
Catharine MacKinnon argues that the First Amendment is used to
guarantee the continued speech of the dominant group (men) at the
expense of the dominated (women), who are silenced." Similarly, in
the context of racism, commentators have argued that hate speech
silences minorities, thereby distorting the marketplace of ideas."
The second and third justifications, self-fulfillment and self-gov-
ernment, derive from Justice Brandeis's concurring opinion in Whitney
v. California." Self-fulfillment, as a justification for the First Amend-
ment, rests on the belief that a proper goal for human life is the full
realization of human character and potential." Because achievement
of this goal requires the mind to be free, restriction on expression
should be prevented.4° Self-fulfillment requires "the freedom to com-
municate.'" Although to a lesser extent than the marketplace theory,
self-fulfillment also relies on counter-speech, rather than state regula-
tion, to best answer offensive or harmful speech. 42
35 See. Kairys, supra note 24, at 264-66 (freedom of speech validates and legitimizes existing
social and power relations and masks lack of real participation and democracy).
36 MACKINNON, supra note 34, at 156.
37 See Charles R. Lawrence 111, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus,
in WoRDS THAT WOUND 53, 78 (1993). Obvious differences exist between outing and racist
speech. Racist speech is used by the majority, according to Lawrence, to subhumanize the
minority. Id. at 68. When gays out gays in order to create role models, it is more difficult to argue
that the owed are subhumanized.
38 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, j., concurring); see Lahav, supra note 25, at 459.
Brandeis wrote:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to
make men free to develop their litculties; and that. in its government the deliberative
forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as
a means. 'limy believed liberty to he the secret of happiness and courage to be the
secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and speak as you
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, 3., concurring).
"59 Titomns I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970). As Justice Thor-
good Marshall wrote:
'Fl! First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of the
human spirit—a spirit that demands self:expression. Such expression is an integral
part of the development of ideas and a sense of identity. To suppress expression is
to reject the basic human desire for recognition and affront the individual's worth
and dignity.
Procunier v. Martinez., 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
49 EMERSON, ,supra note 39, at 6. "[Sluppression of belief, opinion, or other expression is an
affront to the dignity of man." Id.
Solum, supra note 27, at 80.
42 EMERSON, supra note 39, at 8. As Emerson wrote:
The theory asserts that freedom of expression, while not the sole or sufficient end
of society, is a good in itself, or at least an essential element in a good society. The
society may seek to achieve other or more inclusive ends—such as virtue, justice,
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The third justification, self-government, is most closely associated
with the work of Alexander Meiklejohn." For Meiklejohn, the First
Amendment is not a device for finding the truth." Rather, the First
Amendment assures that every member of the body politic has access
to the information necessary for a full understanding of, and partici-
pation in, self-government." Thus, for Meiklejohn, no idea, opinion,
belief or any other type of information may be withheld from any
citizen, and no citizen may be restrained from participating fully in
self-government."
According to the latter two justifications, satisfying the purposes
of the First Amendment would require that government actively protect
minorities' ability to speak.'" The First Amendment should, according
to these justifications, ensure that no one is prohibited from speaking
on issues of public importance." Thus, the First Amendment should
equality, or the maximum realization of the potentialities of its members. These are
riot necessarily gained by accepting the rules for freedom of expression. But, as a
general proposition, the society may riot seek them by suppressing the beliefs or
opinions of individual members. To achieve these other goals it must rely upon
other methods: the use of counter-expression and the regulation or control of
conduct which is not expression. Hence the right to control individual expression,
on the ground that it is judged to promote good or evil, justice or injustice, equality
or inequality, is not, speaking generally, within the competence of the good society.
Id.
"Sohun, supra note 27, at 72; see MEtKI.EJoI!N, supra note 32, at 24. Meiklejohn's model of
freedom is the "traditional American town meeting," MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 32, at 24.
In the town meeting the people of a community assemble to discuss and to act upon
the matters of public interest .... Every man is free to come. They meet as political
equals. Each has a right and a duty to think his own thoughts, to express them, and
to listen to the arguments of others. The basic principle is that the freedom of
speech shall be unabridged. And yet the meeting cannot even be opened unless,
by common consent, speech is abridged. A chairman or moderator .....calls the
meeting to order." . . . His business on its negative side is to abridge speech. . . .
The town meeting, as it seeks for freedom of public discussion of public problems,
would be wholly ineffectual unless speech were thus abridged.... It is a group of
free and equal men, cooperating in a common enterprise, and using for that
enterprise responsible and regulated discussion. It. is not a dialectical free-for-all. It
is self-government.
Id. at 24-25.
14 M El KLEJOHN, ROM note 32, at 75.
"
46 Id.
47 MACKINNON, supra note 34, at 140. MacKinnon wrote, "What I think is that people who
are absolutely interested in the First Amendment should turn their efforts to getting speech for
people, like women, who have been denied that speech almost entirely, who have not been able
to speak or to get themselves heard." Id.
48 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 40-41 (1993). Rather
than embracing the battle of the marketplace, Sunstein invokes the liberalism of Kant, Mill and
Rawls, and the commitment to "government by discussion." Id. at 248-49.
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guarantee that people from every different perspective and position
found in the United States have equal access to the political process. 49
This conception echoes Brandeis's opinion in Whitney, with its ideal of
democratic deliberation, founded on a norm of political equality." The
First Amendment, according to these justifications, ought to ensure
every citizen's ability to participate in the country's political discus-
sion.`'` In sum, the latter two justifications would require a new model
of free speech, which, rather than protecting social dominance, would
recognize specific experiences, notice who is being hurt and provide
equal opportunity to speak. 52
B. The Cases
The preceding justifications have guided the Supreme Court in
cases in which the First Amendment and privacy rights clash." In 1964,
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court
subjected libel—traditionally a question of state tort law—to First Amend-
ment scrutiny.54 The Court held that a public official must show "actual
malice" in order to prevail in a libel suit. 55 The New York Times had
published an advertisement containing inaccuracies about a local po-
lice commissioner. 56 The Court reasoned that the First Amendment's
guarantee of a free press required protecting some erroneous state-
ments." Because the New York Times had not acted with actual malice,
the Court reversed the previous damage award."
Sullivan, an Alabama police commissioner, believed that he had
been unfairly accused of civil rights violations in the text of an adver-
tisement printed by the New York Times.-" 9 The New York Times had not
made an eflbrt to confirm the advertisement's content, and the ad's
inaccuracies went uncontroverted at trial." The judge instructed the
jury that the statements were libelous per se, and the jury found in
favor of Sullivan."'
46 Id. at 241-42.
5° Id. at. 244-45,
51 Id. at 241.
52 CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 109 (1993).
53 see supra notes 24-52 and accompanying text.
54 See 376 U.S. 254,256 (1964).
55 Id. at 283.
56 Id. at 256-57.
57 Id. at 271-72.
58 1d. at 285-86,292.
59 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256-58.
50 1d. at 258,261.
51 Id. at 262.
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a public official, in
order to bring a successful action, must prove that a defamatory state-
ment was made with "actual malice."62 The First Amendment, accord-
ing to the Court, assured freedom of discussion and a government that
was responsive to the political and social goals of the people. 63 The
Court characterized the right to speak one's mind as "a prized Ameri-
can privilege," unaffected by the content of that speech. 64 The Court
observed that allowing too many defamation suits would detract from
the marketplace of ideas upon which democracy rests. 65 Moreover, the
Court reasoned that an "erroneous statement is inevitable" and pro-
tecting the press is instrumental in providing the "breathing space"
necessary for free debate. 66 The Court concluded that, absent actual
malice, the First Amendment limited a state's ability to award libel
damages in actions brought by public officials.67
In 1967, in Time, Inc. v. Hill, the United States Supreme Court
first faced a direct conflict between the First Amendment and the right
to privacy,° holding that the Sullivan actual malice standard applied
not only to public officials, but also to matters of public interest.° The
case involved a Life magazine story based upon the experiences of an
otherwise anonymous family." Emphasizing that democracy required
the press to have extensive freedom of speech, 71 the Court concluded
that the First Amendment prohibited liability for printing matters of
public interest absent proof of knowledge of falsity or reckless disre-
gard for truth."
Life magazine published a review of a play that described a family
taken hostage by escaped convicts." The play abstracted the true ex-
62 Id. at 283. A finding of actual malice required that the publisher had knowledge that the
statement was false, or else acted with reckless disregard for whether it was true or false. Id. at
279-80.
64 Id. at 269.
64
 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269.
65 See id. at 270Justice Brennan wrote, 'Thus we consider this case against the background
of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." Id.
66 Id. at 271-72.
67 1d. at 283.
s9 385 U.S. 374, 376 (1967); see also Thomas I. Emerson, The Right of Privacy and Freedom of
the Press, HA RV. C.R.—C.L. L. REv. 329, 334 (1970).
69 Hilt, 385 U.S. at 387-88.
70 Id. at 377-78.
71 Id. at 389.
12 Id. at 387-88.
/3 Id. at 377.
May 1995]	 OUTING AND THE LAW	 595
periences of the Hill family, who had involuntarily become a subject
of public interest." The Hills sued under a New York privacy statute."'
The Court held that the First Amendment precluded liability for
printing matters of public interest absent proof of actual malice.'" The
Court ruled that the risk of public exposure is a necessary evil in a
society that highly values freedom of speech and press." Freedom of
the press, the Court reasoned, assures the continued well-being of the
political system. 78 Although the Court recognized the possibility of
revelations that might be so private as to warrant protection, the
decision protected the press."
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Fortas refused to accept the propo-
sition that the First Amendment assumed greater weight than the right
to privacy." Justice Fortas traced the history of privacy, and charac-
terized it as "a basic right."81 He then accused the Court of paying "lip
service" to privacy while, in reality, according privacy no more than
"verbal acknowledgment.""
In 1975, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, the United States
Supreme Court held that liability could not be imposed for publication
of information contained in the public record." A television station
broadcast the name of a rape victim, which the station found in the
public record." The Court reasoned that nothing in the public record
74 Hill, 385 U.S. at 377-78.
75 Id. at 378. New York Civil Rights Law § 50 provided that any use for advertising or trade
purposes, of the name, portrait or picture of any living person, without permission, is a misde-
meanor. Id. at 376 n.l. New York Civil Rights Law § 51 allowed the victim to bring a civil suit. Id.
76 Hill, 385 U.S. at 387-88.
77 Id. at 388.
78 Id. at 389.
79 See id. at 383 n.7. Speaking of a New York Court of Appeals decision interpreting the New
York statute, the Court said:
This limitation to newsworthy persons and events does not of course foreclose an
interpretation of the statute to allow damages where "Revelations may be so intimate
and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the community's
notions of decency." . , • This case presents no question whether truthful publica-
tion of such matter could be constitutionally proscribed.
Id. (quoting Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940)).
8° Hill, 385 U.S. at 412 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Justice Fortas wrote:
There are great and important values in our society, none of which is greater than
those reflected in the First Amendment, but which are also fundamental and
entitled to this Court's careful respect and protection. Among these is the right to
privacy, which has been eloquently extolled by scholars and members of this Court.
Id.
Hi Id. at 412-15.
82 Id. at 415-16.
es 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975).
84 Id. at 471-74.
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was sufficiently private to be entitled to protection. 0 The Court con-
cluded that private information, if it is to be protected, must not
become part of the public record. 86
In 1971, Cohn's seventeen-year-old daughter was raped and killed. 87
Although the press gave substantial coverage to the crime, the victim's
name was not disclosed." Eight months later, during a court session in
which five of the defendants pleaded guilty, a reporter learned the
victim's name by examining the indictments 8`' The reporter then broad-
cast the name on television." Relying on a Georgia statute that made
it a misdemeanor to broadcast a rape victim's identity, Cohn brought
suit claiming invasion of his right to privacy. 91 The Georgia Supreme
Court held that the statute was a legitimate limitation of the First
Arne ndment.92
Reversing the Georgia Supreme Court, the United States Supreme
Court held that the Constitution would not allow liability for publish-
ing truthful information contained in public records." The Court
noted the important "face-off" between the First Amendment and the
right to privacy, and recognized that the case involved a private person
and a very private matter. 94 Because of the "collision" between privacy
and the First Amendment, the Court adopted a case-by-case approach
to the problem rather than answering whether truthful publications
could ever create liability." Citing the important role of the press in
monitoring the government, the Court reasoned that printing matters
contained in the public record must reside within the protection of
the First Amendment." Therefore, the Court concluded that facts in
the public record were not entitled to privacy protection. 97
Expanding on Cox, in 1989, in Florida Star v. B.J.F., the United
States Supreme Court held that the press could publish lawfully ob-
tained material, except under very narrow circumstances." B.J.F. was
85 Id. at 492-94.
8" Id. at 496.
87 Id. at 471.
88 Cox, 420 U.S. at 471.
89 Id. at 472.
90 Id. at 473.
91 Id. at 474.
92 Id. at 475.
93 Cox, 420 U.S. at 496.
94 See id. at 489, 491.
95 See id. at 491.
96 See id. at 491-92.
97 1d. at 496.
88 See 491 U.S. 524, 530, 541 (1989).
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a rape victim:39 After B.J.F. reported the rape, the local police office
prepared a report that identified her.'°° Florida law prohibited the
identification of rape victims in the public record.'°' A reporter trainee
copied the report, including BJ.F.'s name.'° 2 Later, the newspaper
included B.J.F.'s name in its weekly compilation of crimes.'" B.J.F. and
her family were subsequently threatened and forced to change their
phone number and residence, after which B.J.F. sued the newspaper.'° 4
Although the Florida Circuit Court and the Florida District Court of
Appeal found for the plaintiff, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed. 105
First, the Court recognized that it had always upheld the press'
right to publish accurate information, but resolved to continue balanc-
ing free speech and privacy on a case-by-case basis.'"" Although the
Court noted that the "tragic reality" of rape heightened the state's
interest in protecting B.J.F.'s name, the Court observed that the news-
paper had published information lawfully obtained."" Moreover, the
Court reasoned that, while the name was not a part of the public
record, the government had disclosed the name.'" 8 Thus, the Court
concluded that The Florida Star could not be held liable, because
publication of truthful and lawfully obtained information could be
punished only under a narrowly tailored statute protecting a state
interest of the highest order. 1 °9
In a dissenting opinion, Justice White argued that the Court had
not recognized the uniqueness of the facts in this case."" According to
99 Id. at 527.
Id.
mi Id. at 520.
1 °2 Id. at 527.
103 Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 527.
104 Id. at 528.
105 Id at 529. The Supreme Court of Florida denied discretionary review. Id.
1110
 Id. at 530.
107 /d. at 537, 541.
108 See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 535. "1W1 here the government has made certain information
publicly available, it is highly anomalous to sanction persons other than the source of its release."
Id.
1 °9 M. at 541.
11 D See id. at 543-46 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White distinguished Florida Star from Cox
because in Florida Star the name was not in the public record. Florida Star, 991 U.S. at 543 (White,
J., dissenting). Justice White further argued that the majority's reliance on Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co. was misplaced. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 544-45 (Whited, dissenting) (citing Daily
Mail, 443 U.S, 97, 104 (1979) (publication of lawfully obtained, truthful information may not he
punished absent state interest of highest order)). Daily Mail according to Justice White, involved
the rights of someone accused of a crime, not of someone who was the victim of a crime. Florida
Star, 491 U.S. at 545 (White, J,, dissenting). Further, Justice White argued, Daily Mail was a narrow
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White, Florida's statute was sufficiently narrowly tailored to withstand
First Amendment scrutiny. Ill justice White expressed his willingness to
balance the needs of a free press against other important interests, and
condemned the Court for placing too little weight on the side of
B.J.F." 2 The result, according to Justice White, was one further step
toward the inevitable obliteration of the tort of publication of private
facts." 3
In sum, the justifications commonly cited by scholars to explain
the First Amendment are the marketplace of ideas, self-fulfillment and
self-government." 4 In practice, when privacy and the press collide, the
justifications have translated into protection for the press." 5 In Sulli-
van, the Court protected statements about public officials, absent ac-
tual malice."" In Hill, Cox and Florida Star, the Court expanded that
protection to include all legally obtained information about all matters
of public interest." 7 In dissenting opinions, Justices Fortas and White
advocated balancing the First Amendment right to speak against other
equally important rights, such as privacy."'
II. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. The Theory
In contrast to the right to free speech, the right to privacy has a
less certain origin and a more elusive definition."' In 1890, in their
seminal article The Right to Privacy, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
opinion, which explicitly stated that "there is no issue here of privacy." Florida Star, 491 U.S. at
545 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 105.)
Ill Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 549 (White, J., dissenting).
" 2 Id. at 547 n.2, 551 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White wrote: "The Court's concern for
a free press is appropriate, but such concerns should be balanced against rival interests in a
civilized and humane society. An absolutist view of the former leads to insensitivity as to the latter."
Id. at 547 n.2 (Whited., dissenting).
113 14, at 550 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White did not find this step particularly notewor-
thy; rather, he thought the decision had been foreshadowed by earlier Supreme Court cases. Id.
at 552-53 (White, J., dissenting).
114 See supra notes 24-52 and accompanying text.
1111 Flarida Star, 491 U.S. at 530; Edelman, supra note 11, at 1198.
116 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1964).
117 Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541; Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975);
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967).
118 1r/arida Star, 491 U.S. at 547 n.2 (White, J., dissenting); Hill, 585 U.S. at 412 (Fortas, J.,
dissenting).
113 Emerson, supra note 68, at 329-32. This Note is concerned with the tort right of privacy,
which is different from the constitutional right to privacy. EMERSON, supra note 39, at 547; Felcher
Sc Rubin, supra note 13, at n.42. The constitutional right to privacy limits governmental intrusion
upon the privacy of the individual. EMERSON, supra note 39, at 547. The tort right protects the
individual from private behavior. Id.
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Brandeis explained what the right to privacy ought to protect.'" War-
ren and Brandeis hypothesized the existence of a right to be let alone,
which ought to protect citizens from seeing their lives subjected to
public scrutiny through unwanted attention from the media.' 2 ' Al-
though privacy has no clear definition,' 22 it is understood to protect a
zone of individual will from intrusion by the collective society. 123 The
broadest definitions of privacy include allowing control of how infor-
mation about an individual is communicated to others. 124 Commenta-
tors aiming at narrower definitions contend that the right to privacy
protects autonomy, identity and intimacy, 125 or secrecy, anonymity and
solitude. 126
Under any formulation, privacy's aim is to separate individuals
from society. 127 The justifications for this protection are the same as
two of the justifications for the First Amendment: privacy allows indi-
120 See. Samuel D. Warren & Louis 0. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193,193
(1890).
121 /d. at 193,195-96. For instance, '"The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious
bounds of propriety and of decency." Id. at 196.
122 See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 13, at 1582; see also Emerson, supra note 68, at 338-41.
Its Emerson, supra note 68, at 337.
124 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1966).
Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for them-
selves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to
others. Viewed in terms of the relation of the individual to social participation,
privacy is the voluntary and temporary withdrawal of a person from the general
society through physical or psychological means, either in a state of solitude or
small-group intimacy or, when among larger groups, in a condition of anonymity
or reserve.
Id.
As a basis for a legal right, the problem with Westin's definition of privacy is that it is simply
too broad. Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.—C.L. L. REV. 233,261-63 (1977). The
absence of restrictions "confounds every attempt to cabin the right to privacy with prudent and
plausible remedies." Id. at 262.
125 Gerety, supra note 124, at 236. Gerety's article is an attempt to develop a concrete
definition of privacy, which will limit the valid application of the right. Id. at 234-35. Privacy,
according to Gerety, is in danger of claiming to protect so much that it, in fact, protects nothing.
See id. at 261. Thus, Gerety begins with the broad interests of privacy: control and identity. Id. at
263. He then limits privacy by adding intimacy. See id. at 268.
Although Gerety does not address outing directly, he argues that exposure of private infor-
mation has the capacity to "deprive us of autonomy in information at just those points where
autonomy in other important life-choices is at stake." Id. at 287.
126 141111 Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE U. 421,433 (1980). According to
Gavison, those three words are shorthand for "the extent to which an individual is known, the
extent to which an individual is the subject of attention, and the extent to which others have
physical access to an individual," Id. at 433-34 n.40. Gavison characterizes the three things as
capable of operating individually, yet still comprising a coherent whole. Id. at 434. All three relate
to the "same notion of accessibility." Id.
127 WirsriN, supra note 124, at 7; David Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 587,588
(1977); see also Emerson, supra note 68, at 337. It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss the
merits of the many different theories and definitions of privacy. What is relevant is that virtually
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viduals to become fully realized and allows society to govern itself
democratically.' 28 Without privacy, people would be less likely to pro-
duce creative and insightful ideas.' 29 Instead, everyone's ideas would
tend to be identical, stifling individual self-fulfillment, as well as devel-
opment of political ideas.' 8° Privacy also ought to protect sufficient
personal information to insure each individual autonomy in important
life choices. 13 '
Most jurisdictions have recognized a tort for invasion of privacy.'"
Professor Prosser has divided the tort into four different causes of
action, of which the relevant one in an outing case is disclosure of
private facts.'" The tort's definition, though, has never explicitly ac-
all theories and definitions of privacy rely in some form on the benefits of self-fulfillment and
self-government as justifications,
128 See, e.g., D.F.B. TUCKER, LAW, LIBERALISM AND FREE SPEECH 110-14 (1985); Bazelon, supra
note I27, at 589-94; Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1003 (1964); Emerson, supra note 68, at 339; Gavison, supra
note 126, at 444, 445, 455-56.
129 SMOLLA, supra note 26, at 120.
15() See Bloustein, supra note 128, at 1003.
The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life among others and
whose every need, thought, desire, fancy or gratification is subject to public scrutiny,
has been deprived of his individuality and human dignity. Such an individual
merges with the mass. His opinions, being public, tend never to be different; his
aspirations, being known, tend always to be conventionally accepted ones; his
feelings, being openly exhibited, tend to lose their quality of unique personal
warmth and to become the feelings of every man. Such a being, although sentient,
is fungible; he is not an individual.
Id.
131 Gerety, supra note 124, at 287.
We are often forced to present ourselves for judgments by others occupying decisive
institutional positions in our society and in our lives: they will make judgments
about a job, a mortgage, or even a sentence or parole. These others may well have
in their possession such stale, partial, or false information about us . . Far from
consenting to this, we will often have no knowledge of it, and of course no way to
prevent or correct it.
Id.
In Dianne L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's
Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 365 (1983). By Professor Dianne Zimmerman's count, 36
jurisdictions have recognized a private-facts tort. Id.
1M W. PAGE KEETON FT Al.., PROSSER AND KEEToN ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 856 (5th
ed. 1984). Prosser's other torts are: appropriation, unreasonable intrusion, and false light in the
public eye. Id. at 851, 854, 863. The relevant action for public disclosure of private facts is defined
by the Restatement (Second) of Torts as follows:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject
to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a
kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(h) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
REsTATENIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
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counted for the existence of the First Amendment."4 Consequently,
the First Amendment is applied over the structure of the privacy tort,
limiting the scope of privacy's protection for individuals, and maintain-
ing the protection of the press."' One commentator has noted that,
while the Supreme Court could have taken the difficult road of bal-
ancing privacy and speech, it has implicitly chosen the easier road of
First Amendment absolutism.'s 0
Because of this absolutism, the private-facts tort, in practice, has
never amounted to much.'" In 1966, Professor Harry Ka!yen noted
that the newsworthiness privilege, a product of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, might very well have "swallow[edj the tort." One commen-
tator has gone so far as to characterize the creation of the tort as
"pernicious" because it cannot coexist with the First Amendment. 1 • In
this view, the creation of a "phantom tort" has prevented the law from
developing an effective remedy for protecting privacy.'"
B. Privacy Cases
In 1940, in Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a private-facts case, held that
truthful comments about everyday aspects of a person's life could not
be considered so private as to justify liability.' 41 William Sidis' attempts
to escape scrutiny had been overcome by The New Yorker. 142 The court
reasoned that the public interest in a story, at some point, overcame
the individual's desire for privacy.' 45 The Second Circuit concluded that
the First Amendment protected the magazine's story.' 44
In 1910, William James Sidis was a famous child prodigy.' 45 At
eleven, he lectured to distinguished mathematicians on Four-Dimen-
sional Bodies.' 4" At sixteen, he graduated from Harvard College. 141
134 Fetcher & Rubin, supra note 13, at 1579, 1592.
135 See id. at 1585.
ImEdelman, supra note 11, at 1214-15.
137 Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 Law &
CoNTEmr. PROBS. 326, 341 (1966).
Id. at 336.
inZimmerman, supra note 132, at 293.
Id. at 362.
See 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
142 Id. at 807.
143 1d. at 809.
144 See id. at 809-10.
145 1d, at 807.
146 Sidis, 113 F.2d at 807.
147
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Thereafter, he chose to live his life away from public scrutiny, working
as an "insignificant" clerk.'" In 1937, The New Yorker printed a bio-
graphical sketch of Sidis, which he had not approved, and which traced
Sidis' life since he had receded from public view.'" Sidis did not
contend that the story was untrue or unfriendly.'" Rather, he objected
to the publication of private details of his personal life.''' He sued,
including among his claims violation of his right to privacy.'"
The Second Circuit discussed the Brandeis and Warren article,
and recognized the magazine's invasion of Sidis' privacy.'" The court
also reasoned, however, that obtaining information about matters of
public interest, at some point, becomes dominant over any individual's
desire for that information to remain private.' 54 Sidis had once been a
public figure.'" While he had tried to live in secrecy, the story of his
life remained within the broad reach of public concern.'"
The court expressly refrained from declaring that newsworthiness
would always defeat privacy.'" In fact, the court stated that some news
might be so intimate and so unwarranted as to cause community
outrage. 158 But the Second Circuit reasoned that truthful comments
about everyday facts and habits of public characters will generally not
cross the line.'" The Second Circuit ruled that The New Yorker's story
could not be held libelous.m
In contrast, in 1969, in Commonwealth v. Wiseman, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that protecting privacy was a
reasonable interference with publication of matters of public con-
cern. 16 ' A documentary filmmaker filmed inmates in embarrassing
situations, and intended to show the film to the public.'" The court
reasoned that the film was an unnecessary invasion of the inmates'
MB Id.
199 Id.
15° Id.
161 Sidis, 113 F.2d at 807.
152 1d.
153 Id. at 808-09.
164 Id. at 809.
155 Id.
166 Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809.
167 Id.
158 Id.; see supra note 79.
166 Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809. The court did not say what would cross the line. See id.
166 Id. at 809-10.
161 Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d 610,617 (Mass. 1969).
162 1d. at 612-13.
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privacy.' 63
 The Supreme Judicial Court allowed a limited injunction to
protect the privacy of inmates at the correctional institution.' 64
In 1966, Frederick Wiseman, a documentary filmmaker, was given
permission to make an educational documentary concerning the Mas-
sachusetts Correctional Institution at Bridgewater.'" The documentary
was intended to be a non-commercial, non-sensational film.' 66
 Wise-
man and his crew filmed 80,000 feet of film, including pictures of
"mentally incompetent patients . . . in the nude ... [and] in the most
personal situadons."167 The Attorney General subsequently informed
Wiseman that the film was an invasion of privacy. 16" The trial judge
found the final product to be crass commercialism, intended to be
shown in public theaters.' 69
 Witnesses' reaction to the film varied from
those who were adversely critical to those who considered the film to
be fine journalism, educational and artistic.'"
The Supreme Judicial Court reasoned that the film contained
degrading scenes of identifiable individuals, which represented an
indecent intrusion into the privacy of those inmates. 17 ' While the court
did not express an opinion on the tort of invasion of privacy, it did
state that the Commonwealth had a duty to protect the inmates from
any invasions of their privacy. 172
 The court recognized the important
public interest in Bridgewater, and that the film might well lead to
improvements in the institution. 17" The court stressed, however, the
absence of anyone in the film who had any "special news interest as an
individual."' 74 The court explicitly distinguished this case from cases
such as Hill, which treated dissemination of news as more important
than interests in privacy.'" Therefore, after balancing privacy and the
165 1d. at 615.
164 See id. at 618.
165 /d. at 612. Wiseman had originally been denied permission. Id. When permission was
granted, it was subject to the receipt of a letter from the Attorney General, as well as various
conditions to protect the rights and privacy of the institution and the inmates. Id.
166
 See Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d at 613. This is according to Wiseman's statement to the Com-
missioner and Superintendent before he received permission to film. Id.
167 1d.
158 1d. The Attorney General also maintained that the releases that Wiseman had obtained
from the mental patients, pursuant to the grant of permission to film, were not valid. Id.
169 Id.
17°1d. at 614.
171 Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d at 615.
172 Id.
173
 Id. at 616.
"4 /d. at 617.
175 Id, The court upheld the injunction against showing the film to the general public, but
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publication of matters of public concern, the court concluded that
preventing publication did not represent an unreasonable interfer-
ence with speech. 176
Sidis and Wiseman illustrate two different approaches to private-
facts cases. The Sidis court refused to limit the First Amendment right
to speech, while the Wiseman court gave the right to privacy weight
equal to the right to free speech)" The majority of courts faced with
private-fact cases have followed the Sidis approach, giving the First
Amendment considerably more weight than privacy rights." 8
III. OUTING
A. The Politics of Outing
In his book, Contested Closets, Larry Gross documents the history
of outing, and reprints many of the original articles which framed the
debate)" Gross first places outing within its context: homosexuals
"constitute a 'people' set apart" from the society within which they
live)80 Gross explains that, for many years, solidarity within the gay com-
munity, born of oppression, created a code of silence which prevented
revealing the names of closeted homosexuals to heterosexual society) 8 '
Within the gay community, though, tension has always existed
between the right to free choice and the fact that most gay people do
not come out.) 82 The gay liberation movement is founded on the idea
that "coming out" is a powerful political act)" Gays in the closet
remain hidden from society and confirm for heterosexuals how to treat
not against ever showing the film. Id. at 618. The court held that the film could be shown to
legislators, judges, sociologists, and others in the field of custodial care. Id. For those people, the
interest in informing would outweigh the interest in privacy. Id. As the court wrote, "the likelihood
of harm seems to us less than the probability of benefits." M. What is important, for this Note,
is the court's willingness to balance the right to speech against the right to privacy.
176 Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d at 617. The court also based its conclusion on Wiseman going
"unreasonably beyond the scope of the conditional permission." Id.
177 Compare Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711
(1940) with Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d 610, 617 (Mass. 1969).
178 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383 n.7 (1967); Felcher & Rubin, supra note 13, at
1579.
1" See generally GROSS, supra note 1.
188 Id. at 6. For Gross, this idea—a people set apart—"leads inevitably to the question of what
obligations" gays have to their own, separate community. Id.
181 See id. at 13. Gross argues that the code of silence was developed because of, among other
things, homosexuality's criminal status and society's McCarthyist tendencies. Id. at 7, 13.
182 Id. at 21-23.
185 E.g., id. at 20; RICHARD MOHR, GAvs/jusTicE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW
327-28 (1988).
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homosexuals: by hiding the people they love, the argument goes, gay
people convey the message that they are ashamed of their own identi-
ties.'" On the other hand, by living their lives openly, gay people force
heterosexual society to recognize the pervasiveness of homosexuality.' 85
Some argue that only by living openly, and not hiding, will gay people
ever gain freedom and civil rights.' 86
 Thus, a gay liberation slogan
proclaims, "out of the closets and into the streets."187 From the start,
though, the strategy of self-disclosure contained a rift between those
who are openly gay and those who remain in the closet.'" For an
openly gay person, the question is not whether outing is ethical, but
rather, whether hiding one's sexuality is ethical. 189
According to Gross' book, the AIDS crisis was an important devel-
opment on the path to outing because of two lessons learned by the
gay community.'" First, a "gay" disease will not receive adequate atten-
tion from mainstream press or politics. 19 ' Second, the country will only
pay attention to the disease if famous and important people are asso-
ciated with the cause.'" Thus, for groups which battled AIDS, using
'84 Steve Warren, "Telling 'Thies' about Celebrity Closets," an interview with Armistead Maupin,
Au CouRANT, Oct. 23, 1989, reprinted in GROSS, supra note I, at 200, 201-02. Armistead Maupin
is quoted saying:
What it boils down to is, the message that is being communicated is that there is
something wrong with us.... If you are being secretive about the people you love,
you are conveying the impression that you are ashamed of who and what you are....
If gay people themselves act ashamed of who they are, then the straight people
around them have no choice but to believe that there must be something wrong
with it.
Id.
188 Id. at 202. Maupin also said, "the only way to attack the homophobia is to refuse to
maintain the secret of homosexuality, either your own or anyone else's." Id.
1865 one gay man said, at New York City's first gay pride march, "We're probably the most
harassed, persecuted minority group in history, but we'll never have the freedom and civil rights
we deserve as human beings unless we stop biding in closets and in the shelter of anonymity."
TOBY MAROYEA, THE POLITICS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 170 (1981).
187 GROSS, supra note 1,a121.
188 Michael Bronski, Outing: The Power of the Closet, GAY COMMUNITY NEws, June 3-9, 1990,
.74 minted in Guoss, supra note 1, at 262, 264; see also William A. Henry In, Forcing Gays out of the
Closet: Homosexual Leaders Seek to Expose Foes of the Movement, TIME, Jan. 29, 1990, reprinted in
Cuoss, supra note 1, at 205, 207 ("The gay movement is actually based upon two principals that
collide. One is privacy, and the other is disclosure, the process of coming out.") (quoting Thomas
Stoddard, adjunct professor of law at N.Y.L1.).
' 59
 Victoria Brownworth, Campus Queer Query, OUTWEEK, May 16, 1990, reprinted in Gross,
supra note I, at 249, 251. Brownworth asked, "Is it ethical to stay in the closet, pass fur straight,
assume the mantle of heterosexual privilege and enjoy its benefits while those who are openly
gay suffer the oppression of their minority status?" Id.
1 " GROSS, supra note 1, at 34.
151 Id.
192 Id.
606	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 36:587
the media to advertise homosexuality and to show the human faces of
AIDS became essentia1. 193
According to Michelangelo Signorile, the foremost practitioner of
outing, outing is necessary because of hypocrisy in journalism, enter-
tainment and the government.'" Only outing, according to propo-
nents, will make homosexuality visible. 195 Regarding the world of jour-
nalism, Signorile argues that the media happily reports all private
aspects of everyone's life, particularly heterosexual aspects.' 96 The only
taboo subject, about which the media will not speak, is homosexual-
ity. 197
 According to Signorile, the media thereby indicates that being
gay is so bad that it cannot be reported.'"
193 SIGNORILE, supra note 1, at 63. This, of course, is the major strategy of ACT UP (the AIDS
Coalition to Unleash Power). See GROSS, supra note I, at 56-57.
194 SIGNORILE, supra note 1, at xiii–xv. Signorile's column, Gossip Watch, in Out Week, was the
most visible vehicle for outing. Gauss, supra note 1, at x. To give a flavor of what Signorile was
doing, several footnotes will quote at length from some of his columns:
Why am I doing this?
Well, I'll not deny that in the process 1 get some sort of kick out of it. Yeah, its
satisfying; even fun. But there is another, bigger reason. See, FOR ABOUT TEN
YEARS WE HAVE TRIED TO MOTIVATE YOU [expletive] IDIOTS. We have tried
to EDUCATE you. We have tried to make you see that we are all—including
yourselves—being wiped out. We have tried to make you realize that we're being
murdered by a negligent government.
Signorile, Gossip Watch, OUTWEEK, Dec. 17, 1989, reprinted in GROSS, supra note 1, 197, 199.
195 See Crimp, supra note 7, at 311.
196 Responding to the criticism of other journalists, Signorile said:
Of course, none of these seasoned journalists mentioned their own day-to-day
descriptions of the sex lives of heterosexuals—from Gary Hart and Donald Trump
to Liz Taylor and Warren Beatty to Jim and Tammy Faye Bakker to, later on, Bill
Clinton and George Bush. Somehow, to publicize heterosexual liaisons was right—it
was considered "reportage"—while to cover homosexuality was to invade people's
privacy.
SIGNORILE, supra note 1, at 75.
1" Bronski, supra note 188, at 266. Even within the context of gossip, according to Michael
Bronski: "[T] here is a standard blackout on any gay information. Speculation on Liz Taylor's love
life is open season in any newspaper, but speculation as to whom k. d. lang, John Travolta or
Tracy Chapman may be dating is verboten." Id. To emphasize his point, Bronski gives the
following example:
[A]n episode of Joan Rivers' morning talk show . focussed on gossip columnists:
all of the dirt was being dragged out—the Trumps, the Helmsleys, Bess Myerson
and most everyone in Hollywood. Suddenly Joan got very serious and said, "But
sometimes people go too far. That New York paper [OutWeek] is saying those
terrible things about a certain man who has just died, I won't even say his name
[Malcolm Forbes], and it just makes me sick." This from a woman who built her
stand-up comedy and talk show career recycling gossip and quizzing people on their
personal lives.
Id.
195
	 LE, supra note I, at 75. "I smelled homophobia. It seemed to me that the American
media didn't report about the lives of famous queers because they saw homosexuality as the most
May 1995]	 OUTING AND THE LAW	 607
According to those in favor of outing, not only does the media
not report homosexuality, but also, it actively participates in an elabo-
rate cover-up in order to make gay celebrities appear heterosexual.'"
Thus, the outing movement might be considered a journalistic move-
ment aimed at treating homosexuality as equal to heterosexuality.'"
Given that heterosexuality is not hidden by the press, or treated as
private and unbroachable, outers ask why homosexuality should be so
treated."'
Signorile's outing campaign aimed particularly at powerful gay
figures who either used their power to hurt gay people or declined to
use their power to help gay people. 202 Signorile outed Pete Williams,
the Pentagon spokesman seen on television every day during the Gulf
War, who, in Washington circles, was known to be gay." Signorile
considered Williams—a powerful figure in the United States Army, an
disgusting thing imaginable—worse than extramarital affairs, abortions, boozing, divorces, or
out-of-wedlock babies, all of which are fodder for the press." Id.
199 See GROSS, supra note 1, at 45-56. Gross argues that gossip and celebrity columnists engage
in what he calls "inning," which is to actively lie in order to make homosexuals appear to be
heterosexual. Id, at 46-47. Examples include speculation about the romances of gay men, such
as Malcolm Forbes and Mery Griffin, or the use of phrases such as "confirmed," "eligible" and
"lifelong" bachelor. Id. at 50-53, Nor is this process restricted to famous people, as Gross
demonstrates by quoting Lindsay Van Gelder's observation about photos from the 1989 Bay Area
earthquake, showing a:
survivor pounding the earth „ so riveting	 that they were sent around the world
... but nowhere was there a mention that the body under the building was anyone
more intimate than a "friend." Later 1 learned that the woman,- a long-time lesbian
activist, had been widely interviewed and completely open about the nature of their
relationship; indeed, she had insisted that it should be acknowledged. Most report-
ers refused.
Id. at 55.
"Gabriel Rotello, Why I Oppose Outing, OuTWEER, May 29, 1991, reprinted in Gross, supra
note 1, at 277,278. Gabriel Rotello argued that "outing" was a misnomer that falsely characterized
the practice. See id. at 277. "Outing," according to Rotello, conveys the idea of a person "being
forced from a safe place into a dangerous one." Id. The closet, he argues, is not actually a safe
place. Id. Rather, the closet is "out" of the community. Id. Those who are publicly gay have "come
in," "meaning into the safety of a healthy self-image and a burgeoning community." Id. Thus, to
Rotello, the correct term is not "outing," but rather, "equalizing." Id. at 278.
201
 Rotello, supra note 200, at 278. Signorile wrote:
Homosexuality seems to be the only area in which journalism in New York is
mandated to pursue lies and cover-ups rather than the truth. If you write about a
closeted gay man's woman friend as his "lover," that is applauded. If you print the
truth you are deemed "frightening and offensive."
GROSS, supra note 1, at 60 (quoting Michelangelo Signorile, Gaystyits of the Rich and Famous,
VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 3,1990, at 23-24).
2°2 Signorile, Gossip Watch, OUTWEEK, July 18,1990, reprinted in GROSS, supra note 1, at 289.
203 See SIGNORILE, supra note 1, at 104-10.
608
	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 36:587
institution whose anti-gay policies are pervasive—a very appropriate
figure to be outed. 204
Signorile also outed powerful, gay, Hollywood figures who acted
against the gay community, such as Barry Diller, head of 20th Century
Fox, who promoted anti-gay comedian Andrew Dice Clay. 205 Signorile
outed David Geffen after a Forbes profile portrayed him as "a jet-setting,
rich, hetero bachelor who'd dated a movie actress. "20° Finally, Signorile
condemned Jodie Foster for her role in The Silence of the Lambs, which
many found homophobic. 207 Those who favor outing believe that gay
204 See id. at 98. Actually publishing the Williams piece ended up being very difficult, because
Signorile's magazine, Out Week, folded the week before the story was to run. Id. at 123. In Chapter
7 of his book, Inning the Outing, Signorile describes Village Voids initial acceptance and sub-
sequent refusal of the piece, before it was finally published in the Advocate. Id. at 124-29. Signorile
also describes the dilemma then faced by the mainstream press, which had to decide how to treat
the story and whether or not to name Williams in their own stories, Id. at 129.
2°5 Signorile, Gossip Watch, OuTWEEK, July 18, 1990, reprinted in Gitoss, supra note 1, at 289,
290-91.
But what we should really concern ourselves with is what the [expletive] Diller
can do for us now. No, we won't be content with his dropping a film with some
homophobe [Dice Clay] screaming offensive remarks. We expect that. THE [exple-
tive] SHOULDN'T HAVE BEEN SIGNED TO BEGIN WITH (as lots of other
offensive acts are not signed because 20th Century Fox has certain standards and
ethics).... We're merely asking for treatment equal to that of other groups which
Fox is mindful of and tries not to offend. . . . What we want is for Fox to develop,
back, distribute and release films about us—about the lesbian and gay community
and about this horrific crisis we've suffered through for ten years, ... What we want
is for Diller to stand up for this community. WHY DOESN'T HE GET TOGETHER
HIS FRIENDS DAVID GEFFEN AND LIZ SMITH AND MERV GRIFFIN AND
HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH THEY COULD ALL DECLARE THEM-
SELVES, HOLD THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABLE FOR ITS ACTIONS AND
TELL THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT IS WRONG? Why
don't they simply say they won't stand for homophobia and won't back homo-
phobes? None of these people is going to lose anything. Two are among the richest
people in America. The other two rule the entertainment industry. No one is going
to stop them. IT'S AMAZING WHAT THEY COULD DOI
Id.
206 Signorile, Gossip Watch, OUTWF.ER, Dec. 26, 1990, reprinted in GROSS, supra note I, 291,
292-93.
[I] t is up to Geffen himself . . . . A simple I'm gay" will do. HERE IS THIS
ALL-POWERFUL QUEER GETTING HIMSELF ON THE COVERS OF MAGA-
ZINES—AND HE CAN'T EVEN STAND UP, BE PROUD AND GIVE VISIBILITY
TO THIS COMMUNITY. Meanwhile, as he revels in his $850 million, the rest of
this community is in a shambles, with a disease ravaging us and while thousands
are being beaten on the streets BECAUSE OF THE VERY HATRED THAT ONE
OF HIS OWN [expletive] BANDS, GUNS N' ROSES, ENCOURAGES.
Id.
eat Signorile, Gossip Watch, OUTWEEK, Feb. 20, 1991, reprinted in GROSS, supra note 1, at 294,
297.
HOLLYWOOD DISGUSTS MEI ALL OF YOU LYING FREAKS MAKE ME WANT
TO VOMIT. Jodie Foster, TIME'S UPI If lesbianism is too sacred, too private, too
May 1995]	 OUTING AN!) THE I.,AW	 609
people who have power, and who use that power to hurt other gay
people, lose their right to invoke the code of silence." 8 Public figures
who pretend to be straight reinforce the idea that America is straight,
and thereby harm the gay community. 209
Opponents argue that outing constitutes an invasion of privacy: 219
Anti-outers do not deny the importance of visibility and of being out
of the closet. 2 M They argue that coming out—which is emotionally and
psychologically difficult—should be done strictly on a voluntary ba-
sis.212 They argue that coming out is a personal decision, and that
intentional outing can be dangerous to those who have chosen to
remain silent for self-preservationPAnti-outers charge outers with gay
bashing and "cannibaliz[ing their] own."214 According to the anti-out-
infringing of your damned rights for you to discuss publicly, then the least you can
[expletive] do is refrain from making movies that insult this community! Is that too
much to ask of you? Jesus, you want to have your queer little cake and eat it too,
right? NO WAY, SISTER1
Id.
208 See GROSS, supra note 1, at 182.
210 Larry Bush, Naming Gay Names, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 27, 1982, reprinted in GRoss„supra
note I, at 177, 181. As Vito Russo, gay activist and author of The Celluloid Closet, explained: "Every
star who is in the public eye does the community a disservice by pretending to be straight ... .
By their silence, they are reinfOrcing the idea that America is straight." Id.
210 See Hunter Madsen, Tattle Tale Traps, OuTWEEx, May 16, 1990, reprinted in GROSS, supra
note 1, at 236, 238; see also Ayofeini Folayan, Whose Life Is It Anyway, OuTWEEK, May 16, 1990,
reprinted in GRoss, supra note I, at. 248, 249.
211 See, e.g., C. Carr, Why Outing Must Stop, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 19, 1991, reprinted in Guoss,
supra note 1, at '274, 274.
212 Madsen, supra note 210, at 237. Hunter Madsen, author of After the Ball wrote in an
Out Week symposium on outing:
Being out is good, but coining out is better. We must cherish the process of coming
out. No gay person should deny another the incomparable, irreplaceable, once-in-
a-lifetime opportunity to come out of the closet under his or her own steam, as the
fruit of deep personal reflection, courage and conviction.
Id.
212 Dirk Johnson, Privacy vs. the Pursuit of Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1990, reprinted in
GROSS, supra note 1, at 222, 225.
214 Bush, supra note 209, at 234; Carr, supra note 211, at 274. Randy Shills, the well-known
author and journalist, said the following:
No matter how high-sounding the rhetoric, outing makes some of the most august
gay journalists and leaders look like a lot of bitchy queens on the set of Boys in the
Band, bent not on helping each other but on clawing each other. It's not a pretty
sight.
As for the nastiness of outing, whether outing is done to Army privates by
Pentagon policy or to prominent officials by the gay press, it's still a dirty business
that hurts people.
SIGNORILE, supra note 1, at 152. Signorile's response was that Shilts failed to realize that outing
is simply a part of journalism, because journalism's business is to tell the truth, not to protect
people or their feelings. Id.
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ers, a bedrock principle of gay rights has always been privacy; outing
is a violation of the right to privacy.215
 The uncertain and speculative
benefit of outing is simply not great enough to justify the outing. ►
The outers' response to the criticism is that the "right" to privacy,
in this context, is not a right at al1. 217
 Rather, being in the closet is
"having to hide the way you live because of fear of punishment." 218
 The
closet is maintained through the force of the heterosexual majority,
not through the choice of gay people. 219
 Being gay, outers argue, is the
equivalent of being black or Jewish; how can that fact be private? 220 As
Michelangelo Signorile wrote, "How can being gay be private when
being straight isn't? Sex is private. But by outing we do not discuss
anyone's sex life. We only say they're gay. "221 Outers are willing to leave
sexual acts private; what they are not willing to leave private is sexual
orien tation . 222
B. The Case Law
In the case that came closest to addressing outing, in 1975, in
Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., the California Court of Appeal held
215 See Madsen, supra note 210, at 238.
216 Carr, supra note 211, at 276. As one lesbian columnist wrote, "I'm still waiting for the news
of Malcolm Forbes's homosexuality to improve my life." Id.
217 GROSS, supra note 1, at 148 (quoting Scott Tucker).
[T]he right to privacy is easily translated into the duty of sexual secrecy. . . . A
standard statement made by both gay rights advocates and anti-gay bigots is that
sexuality is a private matter. Each side means something different: Let us live our
lives in peace, and Get back into the closet.
Id.
218 /d. at 67.
216 Id.; Crimp, supra note 7, at 305 (closet is function of compulsory and mandatory hetero-
sexuality).
220 See SI GNORILE, supra note I, at 79-80. In his book, Signorile quotes at length a pro-outing
piece by Marshal Alan Phillips, which appeared opposite the Randy Shilts piece quoted above.
If a public figure is Jewish or Jehovah's Witness or Hindu, divorced or married or
single, Asian or Icelandic or Kenyan, those personal and private facts, if verified,
may be duly reported. No need for an on-the-record admission. Only in the case
of gays does this silly rule of invisibility apply.
It is based on the hackneyed straight assumption that, somehow, being a gay
person is innately bad. Never mind that such a person may be well-bred, well-edu-
cated and doing a terrific job, have a stable romantic relationship, even attend
church every Sunday. If he or she is gay, the media pulls a pious veil of privacy
around that fact. Why? Because doing otherwise would confirm the terrifying (to
straight folks) truth that gays are normal, happy, well-adjusted, hard-working, capa-
ble and everywhere. If you're not gay, you know someone who is.
SIGNORILE, supra note 1, at 157.
221 Id. at 80. Therefore, one might say that outing "outs" the media's homophobia, not the
sexual orientation of gay people. See Crimp, supra note 7, at 307.
222 GROSS, supra note 1, at 168-69.
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that publication of a man's well-known homosexuality was not cause
for liability. 223
 Sipple was identified in newspapers as a gay man after
he helped to thwart an attempted assassination of President Gerald
Ford.224
 The court reasoned that private facts had not been exposed,
because the man's homosexuality was well known. 225
 Therefore, the
court concluded that liability could not be imposed. 22'
. In 1975, Oliver W. Sipple, an ex-marine, became a focus of media
attention when he obstructed an attempt to assassinate President Ger-
ald R. Ford. 227 Two days after the event, a column in the San Francisco
Chronicle identified Sipple as a prominent member of the city's gay
community. 228 Newspapers around the country picked up the report,
some speculating that President Ford had treated Sipple shabbily be-
cause of Sipple's sexual orientation.229 Sipple sued the Chronicle for
invasion of privacy. 2" He claimed that the paper had published private
facts, without authorization."' Sipple claimed the publication was highly
offensive because his family had learned about his homosexuality through
the papers.'" As a consequence of publication, according to Sipple, he
had been abandoned by his family, as well as exposed to contempt and
ridicule which caused mental anguish, embarrassment and humili-
ation.233
 The San Francisco County Superior Court granted summary
judgment for the newspaper. 234
The California Court of Appeal listed the elements of a tortious
public disclosure, but noted that the First Amendment exempted the
press from liability if the disclosure is truthful and newsworthy. 235 The
court determined that Sipple's sexual orientation and participation in
the gay community was well-known, therefore private facts had not
been disclosed. 2" His sexual orientation was "in the public domain"
and "open to the eye of the public."'" In addition, the court reasoned
that Sipple's sexual orientation was newsworthy. 238
 The publications
225
 201 Cal. Rpm 665, 669 (Cal. Gt. App. 1984).
224 /d. at 666.
225 Id. at 669.
226 Id. at 671.
227 id. at 666.
228 Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
229 Id.
259 Id. at 667.
251 Id.
252 Id.
233 Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
254 1d.
29.5
	 at 667-68.
236 Id. at 669.
237 Id.
298 Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 669.
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were not motivated by sensationalism, but rather, were motivated by
legitimate political considerations, because Sipple might combat the
false stereotypes of gays. 2s9
 The court concluded that Sipple's story was
genuine news, and was therefore protected from liability. 240
IV. IS THE CONFLICT REALLY A CONFLICT?
Whether the First Amendment prevents all suits for the publica-
tion of truthful information about private issues is technically still open
to debate, because the United States Supreme Court has consistently
and explicitly said it is leaving the issue open. 241
 The cases show that
the Court has rarely ruled against the press, and that the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of free speech has usually meant that the press is free
from legal interference with what it chooses to print. 242
 The Supreme
Court has given lip-service to the privacy interests of those injured by
printed material, but, for the sake of robust, open debate, has generally
read the First Amendment to protect the liberty of the press. 245
 Thus,
should an outing case ever actually reach the courts, it is hard to
imagine that liability will be found. 244
Under current law, a court would apply standards such as true/false,
newsworthy and public/private to the outer's speech, in order to de-
termine whether or not that speech is protected by the First Amend-
ment. Commentators have already attempted to apply these standards,
and have identified a number of potential problems. 245 The true/false
dichotomy does not create a clear, static line in relation to sexual
orientation. 246 Newsworthiness is an exceedingly difficult, if not impos-
2" Id. at 670.
240 1d.
241 See Edelman, supra note 11, at 1195. Most recently, justice Marshall wrote: "Nor need we
accept appellant's invitation to hold broadly that truthful publication may never be punished
consistent with the First Amendment. Our cases have carefully eschewed reaching this ultimate
question, mindful that the future may bring scenarios which prudence counsels our not resolving
anticipatorily," The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989).
242 Edelman, supra note 11, at 1198.
245 Id.; Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 530 (Court's decisions have "without exception" upheld the
press's right to publish).
244 See Wick, supra note 10, at 419.
245 See Elwood, supra note 10; Grant, supra note 3; Pollack, supra note 10; Wick, supra note
10.
24'The true/false dichotomy stems from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1969). Sexual orientation is ungovernable by this dichotomy because sexual orientation is not
so simply identified as either "true" or "false." Grant, supra note 3, at 121. When can someone
be considered gay? Id. at 122. How many sexual acts constitute homosexuality? Id. Or, rather, is
homosexuality defined by a lifestyle? Id. Courts might be forced to differentiate between state-
ments such as "X is a homosexual," and "X was seen performing a homosexual act." Id. at 124.
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sible, term to define. 247 Finally, the line between public and private is
not only difficult to draw, but also, tends to be drawn to the detriment
of gay people. 248
After applying these tests, a court would likely determine that the
outing was protected speech; the outed person's homosexuality would
be considered true, newsworthy, of public interest, or, perhaps, public
knowledge. The case would be seen as pitting the weighty speech of
the press against the less-weighty privacy interest of the individual. The
courts, unduly swayed by the marketplace of ideas justification for the
As long as sexuality and sexual identity are not defined by static, clear lines, the Court's true/false
dichotomy will encounter difficulty when used to analyze questions of sexual orientation. See. Mary
C. Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Crisis of the Male/Female Dichotomy,
30 HASTINGS 14. 1131, 1131 -39 (1979); Rhonda Rivera, Our Straight-Laced judges: The Legal
Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS Li. 799, 800-02 (1979).
247 See Elwood, supra note 10, at 754-56; Pollack, supra note 10, at 734-49. The newsworthi-
ness defense limits liability to statements which are of no legitimate concern to the public—that
is, they are not newsworthy. See REsTierEmmr (SECOND) OF Toiers § 6520 (1977). The Ninth
Circuit adopted the following Restatement definition of newsworthy:
In determining what is a matter of legitimate public interest, account 'mist be taken
of the customs and conventions of the community; and in the last analysis what is
proper becomes a matter of the community mores. The line is to be drawn when
the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is entitled,
and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake,
with which a reasonable. member of the public, with decent standards, would say
that be had no concern.
Virgil v. Time, inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976).
Some feel that only the media, because that is its job, is qualified to decide what is newswor-
thy. Elwood, supra note 10, at 755. This view, though, would seem to destroy the public disclosure
tort altogether. Id.
Mbre subtle definitions also encounter problems. Clearly, a gay politician who continually
votes against gay rights is a newsworthy story. Pollack, supra note 10, at 738. How would the
newsworthy standard apply to a private figure involved in a public event? Id. at 741. Although
commentators have argued different theoretical lines, in practice the courts have steadily ex-
panded the "newsworthy" category. Elwood, supra note 10, at 755-56. The sexual orientation of
anyone well known enough to actually be outed would probably be considered newsworthy under
any standards that the courts have adopted.
248The public/private dichotomy is problematic because it is not clear which facts, conducts
or issues the right to privacy protects. Pollack, supra note 10, at 725. When is sexual orientation
a private fact? See id at 727-28. Gays are wrongly forced into the closet because society discrimi-
nates. However, when gays move towards equality by becoming open with their lifestyle, they
ffirfeit their "private" status, and become "public" figures. See Wick, supra note 10, at 428.
It is problematic to argue that any fact that the press has discovered is still a private fact. See
Wick, supra note 10, at 422. It is also problematic to argue that sexual orientation—the way in
which we relate to others—can ever be a private fact. See Pollack, supra note 10, at 730.
As applied to gay people, it is clear that the Supreme Court's interpretation of privacy is nut
a beneficial interpretation. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For a general discussion
of Bowers and its impact on privacy rights, see Rhonda Copelon, A Crime Not Pit to be Named: Sex
Lies and the Constitution, in THE Pouncs or Ems' 177 (David Kairys ed., rev, ed. 1982) (privacy
is not tolerable when it protects proud alternative to social norms).
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First Amendment, would protect the press in the name of robust, open
debate. While the damage done to outed individuals might be recog-
nized, it would be considered a necessary evil in a society which places
so much value on the speech of the press. An outed person's remedy,
under the marketplace theory, would be in speaking for herself.
This approach fails to take into account the perspective of the
outed individual. In examining outing, the law ought to attempt to
view the question from the perspective of a gay person who is either
in the closet, or outed, 299
 because those are the individuals upon whom
the law has the most effect. 2" The outing dilemma has been charac-
terized as presenting a tragic dilemma: either way, someone is hurt. 25 '
It is the hurt, the real world effect, on which the law ought to focus,
and the effect on individuals, in particular. 252 Therefore, this argument
will attempt to consider the issue of outing from the perspective of a
gay individua1. 253
249 AD assumption of this Note is that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is
pervasive in American society and the American legal system. E.g., Editors of the Harvard Law
Review, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 43, 73, 170 (1990). Discrimination and prejudice
against gays were recognized by judge Patrick F. Kelly, in jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Stipp. 1543, 1548-51
(D. Kan. 1991).
25° See Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, A Journey Through Forgetting, in THE FATE OF LAW
209, 209-11 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R, Kearns eds., 1991). Sarat and Kearns argue that law's
violence is inflicted "wherever legal will is imposed on the world, wherever a legal edict, a judicial
decision, or a legislative act cuts, wrenches, or excises life from its social context." Id. at 210. Or,
as Robert Cover wrote, the law always plays "a field of pain and death." Robert Cover, Violence
and the Word, 95 YALE U. 1601, 1601 (1986).
251 Stuart Byron, Naming Names, ADVOCATE, Apr. 24, 1990, reprinted in GROSS, supra note 1,
at 233, 235. Writing for the Advocate, Stuart Byron offered this assessment of outing:
I used to think that "dragging people out of the closet" was unacceptable under
all circumstances. Now that Maupin and OutWeek have made me rethink the question,
Eve moved somewhat to the left. I see the issue as presenting a tragic dilemma to
the gay community and the gay press, and it is one for which every answer is equally
troubling. No matter what position one takes, someone's going to get hurt.
Id. at 235. Byron's conclusion applies equally to the legal dilemma: whichever way the First
Amendment applies, gay people are injured.
252 Sarat and Kearns argue that, because law plays on a field of violence, a jurisprudence of
violence is needed. Sarat & Kearns, supra note 250, at 221. In other words, law must acknowledge
the distance between law's appeal to reason, and its reliance on force. Id. Only after it has
recognized the violence inherent in law, can any system of jurisprudence be valid. See id. The
violence inherent in a judge's decisions in not only criminal law, but also, civil law, is discussed
by judge Patricia M. Wald of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Violence Under the Law: A Judge's Perspective, in LAW'S VIOLENCE 77 (Austin Sane &
Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992).
As Tom Gerety wrote of the publication of private facts, "When effective ... such disclosures
wrench what was private out of its context with an abruptness and force indeed massive." Gerety,
supra note 124, at 292 (emphasis added).
255 As the author, I have been aware throughout the process of writing this Note of the
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Some speech has power not only for what it says, but more impor-
tantly, for what it does. 254 At some point, expressing certain words
becomes a harmful act.255 Outing is a harmful act because of the
unique nature of coming out. Announcing another individual's sexual
orientation does great harm to that individual's ability to achieve
self-fulfillment and to participate in government.
Outing someone takes away that person's ability to come out on
her own. Coming out is not only an important personal event, but also,
arguably, the most important political act which a gay person can
make. 256 By outing a gay person, the press speaks for that individual
and steals the ability to ever make an important political declaration. 257
As such, outing harms an outed person's ability to participate in gov-
ernment.
In addition, an outed person's voice loses authority."' When a
voice belongs to a group which historically has been hated, ideas
spoken in that voice are less persuasive.259
 Being identified as gay can
thus reduce a person's ability to be an effective advocate for any
political position. 26° Again, outing defeats the ability to participate in
government.
Coming out is also instrumental in creating a gay person's iden-
tity."' A person who is declared to be gay by someone else is deprived
of the ability to define his own identi ty. 262 At least one federal judge
difficulty in undertaking this project as a straight marl. Nowhere is this problem more evident
than with this sentence. One might easily argue that I have no business attempting to figure out
anything that depends upon a perspective that I have not experienced. However, as the law must
attempt to view outing from the perspective of a gay individual, so must 1 attempt it.
264 MACKiNNON, supra note 52, at 29. MacKinnon is not the only commentator to make this
observation. For instance, Professor Edward J. Bloustein wrote, "What matters for a legal system
is what words do, not what they say . . . ." Edward J. Bloustein, Holmes: His First Amendment Theory
and His Pragmatist Bent, 40 RUTGERS L. Rim 283, 299 (1988).
256 MACKINNON, supra note 52, at 30, MacKinnon argues that all actions express some idea
or say something, including murder and rape. Id. This does not, however, make murder or rape
into protected expression, although speech theory never says why not. Id.
266 MOHR, supra note 183, at 327-28, 331.
257 After all, you cannot come out twice. Thus, to be outed is to lose your ability to join in
the public discussion. Being outed takes away the most important statement that the First
Amendment could protect.
265
 "Because of the immediate and severe opprobrium often manifested against homosexuals
once so identified publicly, members of this group are particularly powerless to pursue their rights
openly in the political arena." Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
2" See Lawrence, supra note 37, at 78.
26" Id. at 79.
251 MOHR, supra note 183, at 327. See Gerety, supra note 124, at 282.
262 0n the importance of identity within the context of the law, see Janet E. Halley, The
Construction of Heterosexuality, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET 91-99 (Michael Warner ed., 1993)
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has recognized homosexuality as a central trait of personhood, intrin-
sic in an individual's sense of self. 263
 The spoken act of outing defines
an individual's identity, thereby constructing social reality for that
individual. 2" Outing defeats a person's ability to define central aspects
of her own identity, and thereby defeats the ability to achieve self-fulfill-
ment.
Stripping away the ability to voluntarily come out harms the outed
person's ability to achieve self-fulfillment and to participate in govern-
ment. Therefore, the right to come out is something that ought to be
protected by both the right to privacy and the First Arnendment. 2"
Outing is different from ordinary media speech because of its impact
on these protected interests, and the law ought to recognize it as
such. 266
 In the context of outing, the goals of the right to privacy exist
consistently with the goals of the First Amendment. 267 Both demand
that an outed individual be protected.
When the gay press outs a gay individual, the group acts in what
it perceives as the best interests of the entire group. 268 Although this
allows for a compelling argument on behalf of outing, it must be
resisted. Comers, analogizing gays to Jews in Nazi Germany, argue that
(next generation of constitutional arguments must explain why official imposition of fixed
identities and official administration of incoherent identities undermine civic values).
263jazitz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543,1548 (D. Kan. 1991) (sexual orientation may be altered
only at expense of significant damage to sense of self).
2" See MACKINNON, supra note 52, at 30-31.
265 This is different from arguing that the right to remain in the closet ought to be protected,
although the arguments may be two sides of a coin. See Elwood, supra note 10, at 765-66. Elwood
argues that if gay people are not able to keep their identities hidden, free thought and free
discussion will be stultified. Id. Elwood compares the right to remain in the closet to the right of
the NAACP to keep its members' names a secret. Id.; see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,462-63
(1958) (exposure of members' names may adversely affect group's ability to be effective).
266 It is axiomatic of this argument that gay people in contemporary American society be
understood as a group that is subject to discrimination because of its status. See, e.g., MOHR, supra
note 183, at 27-31. With this understanding, the law may legitimately treat gay people (and
therefore outing) differently from heterosexuals, because gay people are differently situated. See
Martha Minow, Partial Justice: Law and Minorities, in THE FATE LW LAW 67-77 (Sarat & Kearns
eds., 1991) (law should recognize multiple, irreconcilable perspectives inherent in heterogene-
ous, pluralistic society).
267 In Fact, Rodney Smolla argues that privacy aids free speech, because a "life devoid of any
intimacy or quiet contemplation is a life less likely to produce creative or insightful expression."
SMOLIA, supra note 26, at 120.
268 See Lauren Berlant & Elizabeth Freeman, Queer Nationality, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANKr
193,199 (Michael Warner ed., 1993). Berlant and Freeman argue that Queer Nation's policy of
making homosexuality visible attempts to shift from "silent absence into present speech, from
nothingness into collectivity." Id. Although this is a worthy goal, outing creates more than present
speech. Because the outed individual has not chosen to speak, the outing also creates a present,
spoken for, silence.
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they are exposing those who believe "they'll never get marched to the
gas chambers because 'nobody knows.'"269 Anti-outers correct the anal-
ogy, saying that the outers are "Jews lining up other Jews to go to a
concentration camp."27° Outing is a situation in which the speech of
the individual is at least as weighty as the speech of the press. Recog-
nizing this equality of interests would require the Supreme Court to
refocus the supposed conflict between the First Amendment and pri-
vacy on the mutual justifications of self-fulfillment and self-govern-
ment.
The law's current approach fails to weigh heavily enough the
significance of the rights lost by the individual who is outed. The First
Amendment, according to Justice Brennan, has as its bedrock principle
that speech may not be prohibited because "the idea itself [is] offensive
or disagreeable." 271 Prohibiting outing is not prohibiting an offensive
or disagreeable idea. 272 Rather, it is prohibiting a harmful act. It is
protecting information which is reserved for times when individuals
believe themselves to be in private. 273 Outing shows the importance of
according the mutual justifications for privacy and the First Amend-
ment the weight of a fundamental right, which can stand against the
weight of the marketplace-justified First Amendment. 274
So far, the Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality
of the private-facts tort. But the hallmark of the common law has always
been its adaptability. Where publication of private facts has preempted
a unique and important aspect of an individual's political speech, the
individual ought to be able to recover. She ought to be able to recover
because her rights to both privacy and speech have been injured. Until
society changes, gay people—as both individuals and as a community—
will be oppressed. An expansion of the invasion of privacy tort would
recognize this situation, and recognize the right of both the individual
and the community to speak. 275
263 BrownwoTth, supra note 189, at 251.
2" GROSS, supra note 1, at 127.
271 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
272 "Both intrusion and publication of private facts implicate 'invasions' of interests distinct
from mere outrage at a speaker's message; they are forms, so to speak, of 'psychic trespass.'"
SMOLLA , supra note 26, at 380 n.2; see also, MACKINNON, supra note 52, at 105.
273 See TUCKER, SUPTa note 128, at 118.
274 For instance, TOM Gerety argues that by using his strong, yet limited definition of privacy,
we gain a concept that requires "some strong argument of policy or urgency to justify us in
overriding it." Gerety, supra note 124, at 281.
273 Scott Tucker characterizes this as a Rawlsian approach, wherein every citizen's right to
equal concern and respect in the design of political institutions is fundamental to all other rights.
TUCKER, supra note 128, at 59.
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In current privacy versus First Amendment jurisprudence, the
marketplace theory is dominant, and the press' right to speak is pro-
tected. In a self-fulfillment and self-government based First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, privacy and the First Amendment would not nec-
essarily be pitted against each other. Under the current law, an outed
individual's right to achieve self-fulfillment and to participate in gov-
ernment would not be protected, because the press and the market-
place are overly protected. Outing, therefore, shows the need to fur-
ther develop the common law right to privacy tort in conjunction with
the First Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
Outing is a harmful act, which prevents gay people from making
an extremely important political statement. First Amendment jurispru-
dence, unduly influenced by the marketplace of ideas theory, would
call outing merely "offensive," and therefore require that outing be
tolerated. According to the marketplace of ideas theory, the best an-
swer to outing is more speech.
The answer of more speech, though, fails to recognize the harm
caused by outing. Outing prevents a person from achieving self-fulfill-
ment and from participating in government. Both of these interests
are supposed to be protected by both the First Amendment and the
right to privacy. Under current law, in an outing case, the First Amend-
ment would protect the press' speech. By focusing on self-fulfillment
and self-government, the First Amendment and the right to privacy
could be brought together, in a unified theory. Under a unified theory,
the speech and privacy of gay people would be protected by an ex-
panded private-facts tort, which would work in conjunction with the
First Amendment.
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